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Abstract
Thanks to their quick placement and high flexibility, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be very
useful in the current and future wireless communication systems. With a growing number of smart
devices and infrastructure-free communication networks, it is necessary to legitimately monitor these
networks to prevent crimes. In this paper, a novel framework is proposed to exploit the flexibility of
the UAV for legitimate monitoring via joint trajectory design and energy management. The system
includes a suspicious transmission link with a terrestrial transmitter and a terrestrial receiver, and a
UAV to monitor the suspicious link. The UAV can adjust its positions and send jamming signal to
the suspicious receiver to ensure successful eavesdropping. Based on this model, we first develop an
approach to minimize the overall jamming energy consumption of the UAV. Building on a judicious (re-
)formulation, an alternating optimization approach is developed to compute a locally optimal solution
in polynomial time. Furthermore, we model and include the propulsion power to minimize the overall
energy consumption of the UAV. Leveraging the successive convex approximation method, an effective
iterative approach is developed to find a feasible solution fulfilling the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. Extensive numerical results are provided to verify the merits of the proposed schemes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Featuring high flexibility, swift deployment, and wide coverage, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) have been extensively applied to activities such as search and rescue in disaster areas,
inspection of landscapes, and surveillance of forrest fires. Recently, UAVs have found many
use cases in wireless communication networks as cost-effective and on-demand aerial wireless
platforms for areas without cellular coverage [1]–[3], or as flying mobile users within a cellular
network [4], [5]. Cellular-connected UAVs can enhance connectivity, coverage, flexibility and
reliability of wireless communication networks [4], [5]. The UAVs are anticipated to engage
significantly in the fifth-generation (5G) and beyond 5G (B5G) wireless networks, and provide
new services such as real-time image transmission [6], caching and multicasting [7], [8], data
dissemination or collection [1], [9], [10], mobile relaying and edge computing [11]–[13], and
wireless power transfer [2], [14], [15].
As the applications of the internet-of-things (IoT) continue to expand in the current and future
wireless networks, many infrastructure-free wireless links (such as bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and UAV-
enabled transmission) have been established to support communications among IoT devices.
Yet, these convenient networks can be abused for crimes and terrorism, if in the wrong hands.
Therefore, it is necessary for authorized parties to surveil these suspicious communication links
(see [16]–[25]). Optimization metrics for legitimate monitoring typically focused on maximizing
the eavesdropping rate or the non-outage probability [16]. Spoofing schemes were proposed for a
malicious transmission link to maximize the eavesdropping rate [17], or to intervene and change
the communicated data [18]. For a suspicious communication link in [19], the largest achievable
monitoring non-outage probability and comparative intercepting rate were obtained under delay-
sensitive and delay-tolerant scenarios, respectively. Proactive jamming schemes were developed
to maximize the average monitoring rate for multi-input multi-output (MIMO) channels [21],
relay networks [22], UAV-aided links [23], and with a deep-learning approach [24].
Most existing works considered a fixed ground node (GN) as the legitimate monitor, whose
channel typically suffers from severe large-scale path loss and small-scale fading. Yet, the UAV-
enabled monitor can enjoy high-probability of line-of-sight (LoS) channels as its flying altitude
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3rises. It is therefore easier for the UAV to obtain its channel gains with the GNs if their locations
are known. Thanks to its flexibility, the UAV can dynamically adjust its positions for better
eavesdropping rate, e.g., by flying closer to the suspicious transmitter. Categorized by the power
sources, there are two types of UAVs, namely, the tethered UAVs and the untethered UAVs [26].
A tethered UAV is linked with a ground control platform, and is powered stably through a cable
or a wire. The lack of mobility has constrained tethered UAVs to a targeted area only [27]–[30].
In particular, the horizontal positions of the UAVs were optimized in [29] to cover a set of
GNs with the least possible number of UAVs. The optimal three-dimensional (3D) deployment
scheme of a UAV was developed in [30] to cover as many GNs as possible with a minimum
transmit power budget.
By contrast, untethered UAVs are powered by laser-beam, on-board battery, and/or solar panel.
They can fly freely and enjoy full mobility in wide 3D space. Communication throughput was
maximized for a laser-powered UAV in [31]. In spite of their flexibility, the battery-powered
UAVs have to revisit their home base repeatedly to refill their batteries during operations,
due to the limited capacity of on-board batteries [32]. The optimal UAV trajectory and power
management schemes were developed in [12] to obtain the largest achievable data rate of a
relaying system, and in [8] to minimize the data dissemination time of a multicasting system.
Since solar panels at the UAVs can harness and convert energy to electric power, supporting
long endurance flights, solar-powered UAVs have also received great research interests. The
optimal 3D trajectory optimization and resource assignment for a solar-powered UAV-aided
communication system were developed in [32] to achieve the largest overall data rate in a fixed
time horizon.
Apart from transmit power, the UAVs consume additional propulsion power to support hover-
ing and moving activities. As a result, the energy management for UAV-enabled communications
noticeably differs from that in current systems on the ground. The largest value of energy effi-
ciency in bits/Joule was obtained in [33] for a fixed-wing UAV via trajectory optimization. Total
(including communication and propulsion) energy usage of a rotary-wing UAV was minimized
in [34] to satisfy the throughput requirement of each GN.
In this paper, we propose a simple model for a rotary-wing UAV enabled monitoring system.
The suspicious transmission link on the ground consists one source (transmitting) node S and
one destination (receiving) node D. When the UAV’s channel condition is worse than that
of node D, the UAV sends jamming signal to the latter as noise to degrade its channel for
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Fig. 1. A UAV-enabled legitimate monitoring system.
successful eavesdropping. The total jamming energy consumption of the UAV is minimized in
a finite period via joint trajectory optimization and power allocation, based on the assumption
of successful eavesdropping at each slot. By judicious reformulation, we transform this non-
convex optimization task into two separable subproblems, each of which is convex when the
other set of variables are fixed. The alternating optimization method is leveraged to develop an
efficient approach that is ensured to converge to a locally optimal solution. Based on such a
solution, some useful insights are also drawn on the changing patterns of the UAV’s trajectory
and jamming policy. To achieve energy-efficient UAV operations in practice, we further consider
a solar-powered rotary-wing UAV enabled monitoring system by including the propulsion power
consumption besides the jamming power. Capitalizing on the successive convex approximation
(SCA) method, an efficient iterative approach is put forth to find a feasible solution fulfilling the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Numerical results demonstrate that with UAV trajectory
optimization, the overall energy consumption can be greatly suppressed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system models. Section
III develops an approach to the UAV trajectory design and jamming energy minimization,
while Section IV addresses the trajectory design and total (jamming and propulsion) energy
management for a solar-powered UAV. Numerical results are provided in Section V. The paper
is concluded in Section VI.
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5II. SYSTEM MODELS
Consider a point-to-point, frequency non-selective wireless communication link from a suspi-
cious source node S to a suspicious destination node D which are geographically set apart by d
meters on the ground. An untethered UAV, traveling at a fixed altitude of H meters, serves as the
legitimate monitor to eavesdrop this link; see Fig. 1.1 The UAV can move forward horizontally
or hover in the air. It can travel in the vicinity above the GNs to improve its eavesdropping
performance. Suspicious nodes S and D have one antenna each, and the UAV operates with
two antennas, one for monitoring and intercepting information from the S-D link (receiving)
and the other for sending jamming signals to node D (transmitting). Therefore the UAV can
perform in a full-duplex state to jam and monitor simultaneously. Since its initial and final
locations are given, the UAV’s channel power gain can be worse than that of D at certain time.
In this case, the UAV sends jamming signal to the latter as noise to degrade its channel for
successful eavesdropping. We assume that the UAV can completely annul its self-interference
from the transmitting antenna to the receiving antenna by adopting state-of-the-art analog and
digital self-interference cancelation schemes [19].
A. UAV Mobility Model
Without loss of generality, we consider a 3D Cartesian coordinate system with nodes S and D
located at (0, 0, 0) and (d, 0, 0), respectively. The UAV is deployed for the monitoring mission
in a finite scheduling horizon of T seconds. We split the period T into Tw time slots given by
T := {1, . . . , Tw}; the duration of each slot is the same as δ. The slot length is selected to
be short enough so that the UAV can be treated as static within each slot. Consequently, the
time-varying coordinates of the UAV are given by (xt, yt, H), ∀t ∈ T , with xt and yt being
the UAV’s x- and y-coordinates over time, respectively. The initial and final locations of the
legitimate monitor are pre-defined and given by (x0, y0, H), and (xT , yT , H), respectively. The
minimum traveling distance for the UAV to finish during the scheduling horizon T is thereby
dmin =
√
(xT − x0)2 + (yT − y0)2. Given the maximum speed of the UAV V˜m, we let V˜m ≥
1Although design freedom can be increased by further optimizing UAV’s altitude, energy consumption as well as risks of
instability and collision will rise. Therefore, rather than frequently adjusting altitude, it may be better for the UAV to fly at a
fixed altitude and avoid vertical movement due to airspace regulation, collision avoidance, energy saving and safety concerns.
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6dmin/T so that at least one feasible trajectory can be found from the UAV’s initial to final
locations.2
Consequently, the UAV’s mobile activity constraints, including its initial and final locations
and speed constraints are given by [12]:
(x1 − x0)2 + (y1 − y0)2 ≤ V 2m (1a)
(xt+1 − xt)2 + (yt+1 − yt)2 ≤ V 2m, ∀t ∈ T (1b)
(xT − xT−1)2 + (yT − yT−1)2 ≤ V 2m (1c)
where Vm := V˜mδ stands for the largest traveling distance of the UAV for each slot.
Remark 1. (The choice of Tw): In general, Tw is chosen such that the UAV can be treated as
(quasi-) static within each time slot, observed from the ground. To guarantee a certain accuracy,
the ratio of the largest traveling distance within each time slot V˜mδ and the UAV altitude H
can be restricted below a threshold, i.e., V˜mδ/H ≤ εm, where εm is the given threshold and
δ = T/Tw. Then, the minimum number of time slots required for achieving the accuracy with a
given εm can be obtained as Tw ≥ V˜mT/(Hεm). The optimization gets more precise with more
discretized time samples, i.e., larger value of Tw. Yet, the computational complexity, given by
O(T 3.5w ), also increases significantly with the value of Tw. Therefore, the number of time slots
Tw can be properly chosen in practice to balance between the accuracy and complexity [9].
B. Communication Channel Model
Malicious users of infrastructure-free wireless communication networks are more likely to
appear in wide rural areas, where surveillance is overlooked. In open rural areas, the buildings
and trees are sparsely distributed. LoS channels can be dominant even for communications
between GNs. Therefore, we can suppose that the communication links between S, D, and UAV
(i.e., node U) are all dominated by LoS channels, which can facilitate analysis on the structural
properties of the optimal solution. The case with non-LoS channels will be accordingly addressed
later. We further suppose that the Doppler effect resulted from the UAV’s mobile activities is
2By considering the time for acceleration, the proposed maximum speed V˜m may be infeasible. However, in practice, the
acceleration time could be very short and thus reasonably ignored, especially when the total flying period or distance is sufficiently
long. From this perspective, we provide a lower bound for the maximum speed.
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7completely neutralized [12], [35]. The distance between S and D is fixed during the entire
scheduling horizon, i.e., dSD = d meters. Hence, the channel power gain of the suspicious link
from S to D is constant and can be expressed as
h0 =
β0
dSD
2 =
β0
d2
(2)
where β0 stands for the channel power at the reference distance d0 = 1 meter. At each slot t,
the channel power gain from S to U for legitimate eavesdropping follows the LoS model as
ht1 =
β0
dt1
2 =
β0
x2t + y
2
t +H
2
, ∀t ∈ T (3)
where dt1 =
√
x2t + y
2
t +H
2 is the link distance between S and U at slot t. Similarly, the channel
power gain from U to D for jamming is
ht2 =
β0
dt2
2 =
β0
(d− xt)2 + y2t +H2
, ∀t ∈ T (4)
where dt2 =
√
(d− xt)2 + y2t +H2 is the separation distance between U and D at slot t.
Let P tx stand for the transmit power by S at time slot t, and P
t
j the jamming power from U
to D to interfere the channel at the suspicious receiver for a successful eavesdropping. Clearly,
the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the suspicious receiver D is
γtD =
h0P
t
x
ht2P
t
j + σ
2
, ∀t ∈ T (5)
where σ2 is variance of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). On the other hand, the
UAV can completely annul its self-interference from its jamming antenna to its receiving an-
tenna. Hence, the SINR (which in fact reduces to signal-to-noise ratio, SNR) of the legitimate
eavesdropping channel at U is
γtU =
ht1P
t
x
σ2
, ∀t ∈ T . (6)
Successful eavesdropping at the UAV requires γtU ≥ γtD. The UAV can achieve this goal by
dynamically adjusting its trajectory to fly close to the source node, and/or adjusting its jamming
power to reduce the channel gain of the suspicious receiver D at each time slot, when the channel
condition of the UAV is worse than that of D.3
3When the channel condition of the legitimate monitor (the S-U link) is better than that of the suspicious receiver (the S-D
link), eavesdropping is performed successfully without the UAV sending jamming signals to the receiver. However, when the
S-U link suffers a worse channel condition than the S-D link, successful eavesdropping can be enabled through letting the UAV
send jamming signals to the receiver to degrade its channel condition.
April 24, 2020 DRAFT
8Note that the assumption of successful eavesdropping at each time slot is tenable and non-
trivial. In fact, malicious users of infrastructure-free wireless communication networks can also
develop counter-eavesdropping measures to ensure secure transmissions on their behalf. One
important method is to transmit secret information in cipher. In order to learn the pattern and
decode the secret information, the legitimate agency treasures every bit of information. In this
case, the cipher transmitted in each time slot is of equal importance for the legitimate agency to
piece together the whole picture. Hence, it is of paramount importance if the eavesdropper can
intercept information from the suspicious link successfully in every time slot.
Remark 2. (Decoding the intercepted information): In this paper, we aim to investigate the
fundamental performance limits of the physical layer approach for eavesdropping, and thus
do not consider encryption for the suspicious link, which is a higher layer technique and can
be resolved as long as there are powerful computing resources. On the other hand, to avoid
being monitored and tracked by legitimate parties, the suspicious link is very likely built, used
and discarded or destroyed in a day, which makes the link not complete or mature enough in
terms of software and hardware to preserve privacy and security. We can thereby reasonably
assume that the temporarily-established infrastructure-free suspicious link is not vigilant against
eavesdropping and does not employ any countermeasures such as signal encryption or anti-
surveillance detection. From this perspective, the UAV can successfully decode the intercepted
information from the suspicious link.
III. LEGITIMATE EAVESDROPPING WITH JAMMING
To ensure successful eavesdropping, the UAV may need to jam the transmission from S to
D. For an untethered UAV without incessant power supply, it is clear that we wish to minimize
its overall jamming energy consumption. Building on the UAV’s mobile activity constraints
(1a)–(1c), together with the SINR expressions (5)–(6), the optimization task of interest can be
formulated as
min
{P tj },{xt,yt}
∑
t∈T
P tj δ (7a)
s.t.
h0P
t
x
ht2P
t
j + σ
2
≤ h
t
1P
t
x
σ2
, ∀t (7b)
(x1 − x0)2 + (y1 − y0)2 ≤ V 2m (7c)
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9(xt+1 − xt)2 + (yt+1 − yt)2 ≤ V 2m, ∀t (7d)
(xT − xT−1)2 + (yT − yT−1)2 ≤ V 2m (7e)
P tj ≥ 0, ∀t. (7f)
Here we in fact aim to pursue the optimal jamming policy and trajectory design for the UAV.
Note that the transmit power P tx by S can be canceled from the both sides of the inequality
constraints in (7b). This implies that the UAV does not need to know the P tx when making its
jamming and trajectory decisions. This is of practical interest as the suspicious source is certainly
reluctant to let the UAV know its transmit power value.
A. Proposed Solution
Problem (7) is not a convex program because of the non-convex constraints in (7b); hence,
it cannot be dealt with by classic convex optimization methods. To make the problem more
tractable, we introduce two slack variables ut := x2t + y
2
t +H
2, and wt := (d− xt)2 + y2t +H2,
and rewrite (7) as
min
{P tj ,ut,wt},{xt,yt}
∑
t∈T
P tj δ (8a)
s.t. x2t + y
2
t +H
2 − ut ≤ 0, ∀t (8b)
ut − 2dxt + d2 − wt ≤ 0, ∀t (8c)
utwt
d2
− wt − P tjβ0/σ2 ≤ 0, ∀t (8d)
wt ≥ H2, ∀t (8e)
(7c)− (7f)
where (8d) results from (7b) by the following step
h0
P tjβ0/wt + σ
2
≤ β0/ut
σ2
, ∀t. (9)
Note that we change the “=” signs to “≤” signs in (8b) and (8c) to convexify those constraints. It
can be justified that upon obtaining the optimal solution for (8), constraints (8b) and (8c) should
always be met with equality, since otherwise, we can always decrease ut and wt, respectively,
to improve the channel condition of the corresponding eavesdropping and jamming link, leading
to smaller total jamming energy consumption. Therefore, problems (7) and (8) are equivalent.
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Algorithm 1 Alternating Optimization for Problem (8)
1: Initialize {P tj (0), xt(0), yt(0), ut(0)}, and set initial feasible values of {wt(0)} for Problem
(8).
2: for m = 0, 1, 2, ... do
3: Obtain the optimal solution of {P tj (m+1), xt(m+1), yt(m+1), ut(m+1)} with {wt(m)}
fixed.
4: Compute the optimal solution of {wt(m + 1)} with {P tj (m + 1), xt(m + 1), yt(m +
1), ut(m+ 1)} fixed.
5: Update m = m+ 1.
6: end for
Although problem (8) is not convex, it is easy to see that the problem becomes convex with
regard to {P tj , xt, yt, ut} for fixed {wt}, and it is also convex in {wt} for fixed {P tj , xt, yt, ut}.
For this reason, we resort to the alternating optimization method (a.k.a. block coordinate descent)
to solve (8). The proposed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. Since both subproblems
are convex, the globally optimal solution for each of them can be obtained by standard convex
optimization solvers, e.g., the interior point methods, in polynomial time [36]. Clearly, the total
jamming energy of UAV is bounded above zero. For the proposed block coordinate descent
method, the resultant total jamming energy is decreased in each iteration. Consequently, the
proposed approach is ensured to converge to a locally optimal solution for problem (8). As
problems (7) and (8) are equivalent, a locally optimal solution for (7) can be readily obtained.
B. Structural Properties
To draw useful insights on the optimal trajectory optimization and jamming power alloca-
tion scheme, we analyze the structural properties of the optimal solution for the UAV-aided
eavesdropping system.
Lemma 1. When the UAV is in the circular area of A := {(xt, yt)|
√
x2t + y
2
t +H
2 ≤ d,∀t}, it
can eavesdrop successfully without jamming, i.e., P tj = 0,∀t.
Proof. Lemma 1 can be proven through analyzing the characteristics of the transmit and eaves-
dropping rate. When the UAV is in the circular area of A := {(xt, yt)|
√
x2t + y
2
t +H
2 ≤ d, ∀t},
the quality of the channel from S to U (ht1 = β0/(x
2
t + y
2
t +H
2)) is the same as or better than
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that from S to D (h0 = β0/d2). It then readily follows that the UAV can eavesdrop successfully
without jamming.
The circular area of A can be referred to as the jamming-free area. When the UAV is out of
the range of A, the channel quality from S to U is worse than that from S to D. In this case, the
UAV can only eavesdrop successfully by degrading the SINR of the S-D link through jamming.
The amount of the jamming power at each time slot increases with the UAV’s distance to S.
Based on Lemma 1, it can be inferred that when both the initial and final locations of the
UAV are inside A, the optimal jamming policy is always zero, i.e., P tj ∗ = 0, ∀t. As a result,
the optimization problem (7) reduces to find a feasible trajectory within the circular area of A
with P tj = 0, ∀t, i.e.,
find {xt, yt}
s.t. x2t + y
2
t +H
2 ≤ d2, ∀t
(7c)− (7e).
(10)
Since problem (10) is convex, a classic convex solver can be leveraged to obtain the optimal
solution, which is not necessarily unique.
Lemma 2. When the scheduling horizon T is larger than the minimum traveling time of the
UAV Tmin = dmin/V˜m, the UAV will first fly towards the jamming-free area, then fly to its final
location.
Lemma 2 is quite intuitive, as the UAV enjoys a better channel condition when it is closer to
S. Based on Lemma 2, we can further characterize the changing patterns of the UAV’s jamming
policy.
Proposition 1. In general, the UAV’s jamming power obeys the rule of first non-increasing then
non-decreasing. In some special cases, the jamming power either always non-increasing, or
always non-decreasing.
Proof. When the UAV trajectory is fixed, (7) reduces to a jamming energy minimization problem:
min
{P tj }
∑
t∈T
P tj δ
s.t.
h0P
t
x
ht2P
t
j + σ
2
≤ h
t
1P
t
x
σ2
, ∀t
P tj ≥ 0, ∀t.
(11)
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For each time slot, the optimal solution of the jamming power is given by P tj
∗
= max{0, σ2
ht2
(h0
ht1
−
1)}, where P tj ∗ = 0 when the UAV is in the jamming-free area of A, and P tj ∗ = σ
2
ht2
(h0
ht1
− 1) > 0
when the UAV is outside A. The latter can be rewritten into
P tj
∗
=
σ2
β0d2
[(d− xt)2 + y2t +H2][(x2t + y2t +H2)− d2] (12)
where x2t + y
2
t + H
2 ≥ d2. The projection of the jamming-free area on the ground is a circle
centered at S (0,0), with the radius of
√
d2 −H2. To observe how P tj ∗ changes with xt outside
A, we let y2t = d2 −H2 and take the first-order partial derivative of P tj ∗ over xt:
∂P tj
∗
/∂xt = 4x
3
t − 6dx2t + 4d2xt = xt[(2xt − 3d/2)2 + 7d2/4]. (13)
Clearly, the optimal jamming power P tj
∗ increases with xt when xt > 0, and decreases with it
when xt < 0. The same pattern can be drawn from P tj
∗ with respect to yt. In one word, P tj
∗
increases as the UAV flies away from S.
Now consider the following three cases.
Case i): Initial and final locations are both outside A. When the UAV’s traveling time is
abundant, i.e., T > Tmin, it always seeks the trajectory that yields the least energy consumption.
Therefore, the UAV first flies towards A, then to its final destination. The jamming power
experiences the process of first decreasing then increasing. The same jamming policy applies
when T = Tmin and the line segment connecting the initial and final points goes through A.
Case ii): Initial (or final) location is inside (or outside) A, or vice versa. In the first scenario,
the jamming power first decreases to zero, then stays constant till the eavesdropping mission is
accomplished. The jamming power is always non-increasing. If we switch the initial and final
locations, the jamming power then experiences a non-decreasing process.
Case iii): Both the initial and final locations are inside A. The jamming power is always zero
in this scenario.
Combining Cases i)–iii), the proposition follows.
Proposition 1 provides important insights on the optimal jamming policy of the UAV according
to different initial and final locations. It shows that the UAV is willing to travel slowly inside
the jamming-free area and even take detours to reduce the jamming power consumption. Such
a strategy of the UAV is typically the consequence of minimizing the jamming energy only.
Remark 3. (In and out of the jamming-free area): The UAV usually stays in the home base,
awaiting mission assignment, and is dispatched as a legitimate monitor once a suspicious link
April 24, 2020 DRAFT
13
is detected. As the exact location of the suspicious link is not predictable, it is not likely that
the UAV happens to be within the jamming-free area every time. Furthermore, by studying the
UAV’s trajectory with its initial and final locations in or out of the jamming-free area, we can
provide more perspectives and insights for UAV trajectory design when it is assigned a mission
of monitoring. In fact, this is why we consider a more general problem formulation and the
proposed solution is applicable to different scenarios, wherever the suspicious link is located.
C. Extension to Non-LoS Channels
If the suspicious transmission and legitimate monitoring links are located in an urban area,
the channel between the suspicious source and destination experiences Rayleigh fading, which
can be modeled as [37]
ht0 = β0ξtd
−κ, ∀t (14)
where ξt is an exponentially distributed random variable with unit mean, and κ ≥ 2 is the path
loss exponent. The UAV-GN links can be formulated by considering the probabilities of both
LoS and non-LoS (NLoS) channels, where the LoS probability at each time slot for the S-U
(j = 1) or U-D (j = 2) link ptLoS,j is given by [34]
ptLoS,j =
1
1 + C exp (−D[θtj − C])
, ∀t. (15)
Here the values of C and D is reliant on the propagation environment, and θtj =
180
pi
sin−1(H/dtj)
is the elevation angle in degree, which is closely related to the UAV’s distance from the source
node dt1 or the destination node d
t
2. Thereby, the channel power gains of the UAV-GN links are
given by [34]
htj = p
t
LoS,jβ0d
t
j
−κ
+ (1− ptLoS,j)ζβ0dtj−κ, ∀t (16)
where ζ < 1 is the extra reduction factor for the NLoS channel.
The Rayleigh fading in (14) does not affect the original problem (7), while the NLoS com-
ponent in (16) renders problem (7) hardly tractable for existing solvers. To deal with it, we
consider the case when κ = 2; then (16) can be approximated by [14]
htj ≈ η1dtj−2 + η2, ∀t (17)
where η1 and η2 are two coefficients relying on the UAV altitude. Using the expressions in (17),
the objective function and constraints for the NLoS scenario are generally in the same form as
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those in the original problem (7). Similar to problem (8), the variables in the NLoS scenario
can be separated into three blocks, namely, {P tj , xt, yt}, {ut}, and {wt}, due to the product
of P tjutwt invited in constraints (8d) by the NLoS component. The NLoS problem is convex
regarding each block of variables when the other two blocks are fixed, and can thus be solved
by the proposed block coordinate descent approach. Note that due to the approximation in (17),
only a sub-optimal solution can be obtained.
D. Generalization to eavesdropping non-outage events
In this section, we propose a stochastic model for the eavesdropping system by considering
Rayleigh fading for the suspicious S-D link, i.e., ht0 = β0ξtd
−κ, ∀t [cf. Eq. (14)]. The UAV
channels are all LoS, and successful eavesdropping is not required within each time slot anymore.
Instead, we impose a constraint of non-outage probability to guarantee that the total successful
eavesdropping events satisfy a certain threshold over time. We introduce the following indicator
function It,∀t to denote the successful eavesdropping event of the UAV:
It =
 1, if γ
t
U ≥ γtD
0, otherwise
(18)
where It = 1 and It = 0 indicate eavesdropping non-outage and outage events, respectively.
The original problem is extended to the following form.
min
{P tj },{xt,yt}
∑
t∈T
P tj δ (19a)
s.t.
∑
t
It ≥ pnonTw (19b)
(7c)− (7f)
where pnon ∈ [0, 1] is the eavesdropping non-outage probability and constraint (19b) guarantees
that at least 100pnon% of the total eavesdropping performances are successfully operated. Con-
straint (19b) is actually a relaxed (or generalized) version of constraints (7b), which can also
take the form of non-outage probability:
P(γ1U ≥ γ1D, . . . , γTwU ≥ γTwD ) ≥ pnon. (20)
When pnon = 1, problem (19) specializes to the original problem (7). On the other hand, if
pnon = 0, jamming is not needed at all and the optimal value of the objective function
∑
t P
t
j δ
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is zero. In this case, problem (19) reduces to the feasibility problem of finding a trajectory
constrained by the UAV’s maximum speed with P tj = 0,∀t. At optimality, jamming signals will
be suppressed for at most 100(1 − pnon)% of the Tw time slots with worse S-U channels (or
higher jamming power consumptions), and they will be sent, if necessary, in time slots with
better S-U channels. As problem (19) is a relaxed one of the original problem (7), the optimal
UAV trajectory for (7) is also an optimal one for (19), and the optimal jamming energy in (7)
serves as an upper bound for that in (19). Problem (19) can be solved by first solving (7), then
ranking the values of {P t∗j }t from large to small and setting the top 100(1− pnon)% to zero.
E. Extension to two suspicious links
In this section, we extend the original problem (7) to include two suspicious links for the UAV
to monitor simultaneously. The second pair of suspicious ground source and destination nodes,
S2 and D2, are located at (0, s2) and (d, s2), respectively, where s2 is the given y-coordinate of
the nodes. All communication links are assumed to be LoS for simplicity. We assume that the
UAV has three antennas with one of them for jamming and the other two for monitoring each
link. Note that in this case, jamming signal is sent to both links as long as eavesdropping is
unsuccessful over one of the links.
The channel power gain for the S2-D2 link is the same as the S-D link, h0 = β0/d2. The
channel power gains for the S2-U and U-D2 links are given by
ht21 =
β0
x2t + (s2 − yt)2 +H2
, ∀t (21a)
ht22 =
β0
(d− xt)2 + (s2 − yt)2 +H2 , ∀t. (21b)
The SINR (or SNR) of the S2-D2 and S2-U links are given by
γtD2 =
h0P
t
x
ht22P
t
j + σ
2
, ∀t (22a)
γtU2 =
ht21P
t
x
σ2
, ∀t. (22b)
Successful eavesdropping requires that γtU2 ≥ γtD2 , and γtU ≥ γtD for both links. The new problem
of interest can be formulated as
min
{P tj },{xt,yt}
∑
t∈T
P tj δ (23a)
s.t.
h0P
t
x
ht2P
t
j + σ
2
≤ h
t
1P
t
x
σ2
, ∀t (23b)
April 24, 2020 DRAFT
16
h0P
t
x
ht22P
t
j + σ
2
≤ h
t
21P
t
x
σ2
, ∀t (23c)
(7c)− (7f).
Problem (23) can be solved by following the same procedure summarized in Algorithm 1. The
jamming-free area of the S2-D2 link is A2 := {(xt, yt)|
√
x2t + (s2 − yt)2 +H2 ≤ d,∀t}. When
|s2| ≤ 2d, the common jamming-free area, i.e., the jamming-free area for problem (23) is the
intersection of A and A2, which is essentially the intersection of two circles centered at (0, 0)
and (0, s2), respectively, both with a radius of d. When |s2| > 2d, the common jamming-free
area does not exist as A∩A2 = ∅.
It is worth noting that the problem of two suspicious links can be further extended to address
multiple suspicious links with different separating distances, or aerial (rather than ground)
suspicious nodes with 3D optimization of the UAV trajectory.
In a nutshell, we address the problem of jamming energy minimization for a UAV-enabled
monitoring system based on the assumption of sufficient power supply. We provide useful insights
on the UAV trajectory design and reveal its impact on the jamming policy. However, in practice,
such a trajectory design could result in a great cost (and waste) of propulsion power. Furthermore,
it is not possible for untethered UAVs to possess infinite power supply during flight. Motivated by
this, we next investigate the energy optimization based on a more practical setting, by considering
finite power supply and propulsion power consumption at the UAV.
IV. ENERGY MANAGEMENT FOR SOLAR-POWERED UAV
Compared with cables, laser-beams, and on-board batteries, the solar-powered UAVs enjoy a
high flexibility and a long flight endurance in practical deployment. Apart from communication
and jamming power, the UAV consumes additional propulsion power to maintain airborne and
support its movement. Energy-efficient operation of the UAV needs to be achieved by considering
propulsion energy management in system design [34].
Suppose that the UAV has a solar panel to harvest energy and an on-site battery to save energy.
The UAV’s battery is initially charged with E0 amount of energy, and that it can consume ϑ
portion of E0 during the entire working period, and save the (1 − ϑ) portion for emergency
during landing (to a prescribed platform or home base). The UAV can fly horizontally and adjust
its positions dynamically to enhance the eavesdropping performance. We pursue the optimal
trajectory design and energy management scheme of the UAV by minimizing the total jamming
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Fig. 2. Propulsion power versus UAV speed.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR PROPULSION POWER [34]
UAV weight 2 kg
Blade profile power and induced power, P0, P1 3.4 W, 118 W
Rotor solidity and disc area, s, A 0.03, 0.28 m2
Tip speed of the rotor blade, Utip 60 m/s
Mean rotor induce velocity, v0 5.4 m/s
Atmospheric density and fuselage drag ratio, ρ, df 1.225 kg/m3, 0.3
and propulsion energy consumption for the solar-powered rotary-wing UAV enabled monitoring
system.
A. UAV Propulsion Power Model
Besides transmit (jamming) power, the communication related power includes also that for
communication circuitry, information receiving and decoding, signal processing, etc. For sim-
plicity, we suppose that such communication connected power is a constant, represented by Pc
in watt (W) [38], [39]. The propulsion power, which typically depends on the UAV speed, is
essential to support the UAV’s hovering and moving activities. For a rotary-wing UAV with
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Fig. 3. Harvested solar power versus UAV altitude.
speed Vt, the propulsion power at time slot t, denoted by P tm, is given by [34]
P tm =P0
(
1 +
3V 2t
U2tip
)
+ P1
(√
1 +
V 4t
4v40
− V
2
t
2v20
) 1
2
+
1
2
dfρsAV
3
t
(24)
where P0 and P1 have fixed values and stand for the blade profile power and induced power
under hovering mode, respectively, Utip is the tip speed of the rotor blade, v0 denotes the average
rotor induced velocity in hover, df and s represent the fuselage drag ratio and rotor solidity,
and ρ and A are the atmospheric density and rotor disc area, respectively. When Vt = 0, (24)
corresponds to the power consumption of the hovering state. Fig. 2 depicts the typical curve
of P tm versus Vt. The parameters are set according to Table I [34]. It is revealed by Fig. 2
that the UAV speed achieving the least power consumption, i.e., about 41.84 W, happens at
approximately Ve = 22.36 m/s.
We suppose that within each slot t, the UAV maintains a constant speed, which is given by
Vt =
√
(xt − xt−1)2 + (yt − yt−1)2/δ, ∀t. (25)
By substituting (25) into (24), we find that the first and the third terms of (24) are jointly convex
with respect to (xt, xt−1, yt, yt−1), whereas the second term is neither convex nor concave.
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TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR SOLAR POWER [40]
Atmospheric transmittance, α, β1 0.8978, 0.2804
Interception factor of clouds, βc 0.01
Mean radiant power and scaling altitude, F , ∆ 1367 W/m2, 8000 m
Efficiency and size of solar panel, η, S 0.4, 0.5 m2
Altitude of cloud, L, U 500 m, 1000 m
B. Solar Power Model
Generally, the amount of the harvested solar power depends on the atmospheric transmittance
and clouds. As higher altitude results in higher solar intensity, the atmospheric transmittance
increases with the altitude, which can be empirically approximated by the following equation at
altitude H [41]
φ(H) = α− β1e−H/∆ (26)
where α is the largest possible amount of the atmospheric transmittance, β1 is the extinguishing
coefficient of the air, and ∆ is the scaling altitude. On the other hand, the solar strength is
diminished by cloud. The reduction of sun light traveling through a cloud can be formulated as
[32], [40]
ψ(dc) = e
−βcdc (27)
where βc ≥ 0 is the interception factor of the cloud, and dc represents the spacial length that
the sunlight travels through the cloud. Overall, the electric generation power of the solar panels
at height H is given by [40], [41]
E(H) =

ηSFφ(H)ψ(0), H ≥ U
ηSFφ(H)ψ(U −H), L ≤ H < U
ηSFφ(H)ψ(U − L), H < L
(28)
where η ∈ (0, 1) and S (in m2) denote the efficiency and size of the solar panel, respectively.
Constant F is the mean radiant power on the ground, while U and L are the heights of the upper
and lower limits of the cloud, respectively. Fig. 3 illustrates the influence of UAV’s altitude on
the harvested solar power. The setting of the corresponding parameters are listed in Table II
[40].
April 24, 2020 DRAFT
20
C. Problem Formulation
We aim to design the joint energy management and trajectory planning scheme for the solar-
powered UAV aided eavesdropping system by minimizing its total energy consumption, including
the jamming energy and the propulsion energy. Since the UAV flies at a fixed altitude, we can
simply use E to denote the amount of solar power instead of E(H). The problem is formulated
as
min
{P tj ,xt,yt}
∑
t∈T
(P tj + P
t
m)δ (29a)
s.t.
t∑
i=1
(P tj + P
t
m + Pc)δ ≤
t∑
i=1
E + ϑE0, ∀t (29b)
(7b)− (7f).
Constraint (29b) is the energy-harvesting causality constraint, which is imposed to bound the
total consumed energy up to the current time slot not to exceed the harvested energy plus the
battery capacity.
The minimum level of the initially stored energy E0 is chosen such that the UAV can finish
the eavesdropping mission without harvested solar energy, following the shortest trajectory at a
constant speed. In particular, given the line segment connecting its horizontal initial and final loca-
tions (x0, y0) and (xT , yT ), the UAV travels at a fixed speed V =
√
(xT − x0)2 + (yT − y0)2/T .
With V , we can obtain the total propulsion energy Pm and the UAV’s coordinates (xt, yt) at each
time slot. Based on the coordinates, we can further calculate its jamming power P tj according
to (7b) per time slot. Then, we can readily obtain the value of E0 = Pm +
∑
t(P
t
j + Pc)δ.
Remark 4. (3D UAV trajectory design with altitude optimization): 3D UAV trajectory design
can be pursued by including the UAV altitude as an optimization variable Ht,∀t. Considering
problem (7) and the S-U channel condition ht1 =
β0
dt1
2 =
β0
x2t+y
2
t +H
2
t
,∀t, the optimal altitude for the
UAV is the lowest height within the regulated range that it can stay, since the UAV enjoys the
best channel condition in this way and there is no performance gain by increasing its altitude.
On the other hand, considering the model of harvested solar power in Section IV-B [cf. (28)],
a tradeoff can be observed between the UAV channel conditions and the amount of harvested
energy [cf. (29)]. The UAV has to decide at each time slot whether to fly lower or higher to strike
a balance between achieving better eavesdropping performance and harvesting more energy.
With the UAV altitude included as an optimization variable Ht,∀t, constraints (29b) become
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non-convex as the amount of harvested energy Et is altitude-dependent and time-varying. It is
difficult to convert (29b) to convex constraints due to the complicated expression of Et, thus
rendering the new problem hardly tractable for existing solvers. Furthermore, to the best of our
knowledge, there is not a general model to capture the power consumptions incurred by both
horizontal and vertical movements of the UAV, which in turn makes it difficult to pursue a joint
3D UAV trajectory design and power allocation. It will be an interesting direction to pursue in
our future works with altitude optimization.
D. SCA-based Convexification and Solution
The problem (29) is not convex since it consists the non-convex term
(√
1 +
V 4t
4v40
− V 2t
2v20
) 1
2
in
P tm, and the non-convex constraints (7b). The latter can be handled by leveraging the same method
as in Section III. With slack variables {ut, wt,∀t}, (7b) can be replaced with the constraints (8b)-
(8e).
To tackle the non-convexity with P tm, we first bring in slack variables {qt ≥ 0} such that
q2t =
√
1 +
V 4t
4v40
− V
2
t
2v20
, ∀t (30)
which is equivalent to
1
q2t
= q2t +
V 2t
v20
, ∀t. (31)
The second term of (24) can thus be substituted by the linear component P1qt, with the additional
constraints (31). For the purpose of exposition, we now integrate the expression for Vt in (25)
and let
P˜ tm :=P0 +
3P0
U2tipδ
2
[
(xt − xt−1)2 + (yt − yt−1)2
]
+ P1qt
+
df
2δ3
ρsA
[
(xt − xt−1)2 + (yt − yt−1)2
]3/2
, ∀t.
(32)
We can see that P˜ tm is now jointly convex with respect to (xt, xt−1, yt, yt−1, qt). With such a
manipulation, problem (29) can be written as
min
{P tj ,qt,ut}
{xt,yt,wt}
∑
t∈T
(P tj + P˜
t
m)δ (33a)
s.t.
t∑
i=1
(P tj + P˜
t
m + Pc)δ ≤
t∑
i=1
E + ϑE0, ∀t (33b)
1
q2t
≤ q2t +
(xt − xt−1)2 + (yt − yt−1)2
vˆ20
, ∀t (33c)
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(7c)− (7f), (8b)− (8e)
where vˆ20 = v
2
0δ
2.
Note that constraints (33c) are obtained from (31) by replacing the equations with inequalities.
Yet, equivalence still holds between problems (29) and (33). To examine this, we assume that
if any of the constraints in (33c) is met with strict inequality when achieving optimality for
problem (33), we can decrease the related value of variable qt to enable constraint (33c) met
with equality, while reducing the total energy consumption (objective value) at the same time.
Therefore, all constraints in (33c) are met with equality at optimality. The same equivalence also
holds for constraints (8b) and (8c) as explained in Section III. Hence, problems (29) and (33)
are equivalent.
Problem (33) is still non-convex since it consists the non-convex constraints in (33c). However,
it can be tackled with the successive convex approximation (SCA) method by calculating the
global lower bounds at a given local point. In particular, for (33c), the left-hand-side (LHS) is
a convex function in qt, and the right-hand-side (RHS) is a jointly convex function regarding qt
and (xt, xt−1, yt, yt−1). Since the first-order Taylor expansion serves as the global lower bound
of a convex function, we can obtain the following inequality for the RHS of (33c)
q2t +
(xt − xt−1)2 + (yt − yt−1)2
vˆ20
≥ q(l)2t + 2q(l)t (qt − q(l)t )
+
2
vˆ20
[(x
(l)
t − x(l)t−1)(xt − xt−1) + (y(l)t − y(l)t−1)(yt − yt−1)]
− 1
vˆ20
[(x
(l)
t − x(l)t−1)2 + (y(l)t − y(l)t−1)2]
(34)
where q(l)t , x
(l)
t , and y
(l)
t are the present values of the corresponding variables at the l-th iteration,
respectively. By substituting the non-convex constraints (33c) with its lower bound at the l-th
iteration acquired by (34), we can establish the following optimization problem
min
{P tj ,qt,ut}
{xt,yt,wt}
∑
t∈T
(P tj + P˜
t
m)δ (35a)
s.t.
1
q2t
≤ q(l)2t + 2q(l)t (qt − q(l)t ) +
2
vˆ20
[(x
(l)
t − x(l)t−1)(xt − xt−1) + (y(l)t − y(l)t−1)(yt − yt−1)]
− 1
vˆ20
[(x
(l)
t − x(l)t−1)2 + (y(l)t − y(l)t−1)2], ∀t (35b)
qt ≥ 0, ∀t (35c)
(7c)− (7f), (8b)− (8e), (33b).
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Algorithm 2 SCA-based Method for Problem (35)
1: Initialization: Find an initially feasible solution {P tj (0), xt(0), yt(0), qt(0), ut(0), wt(0)} for
Problem (35).
2: for l = 0, 1, 2, ... do
3: Obtain the optimal solution of {P tj (l+1), qt(l+1), ut(l+1)} with {qt(l), xt(l), yt(l), wt(l)}
fixed.
4: Compute the optimal solution of {xt(l+ 1), yt(l+ 1), wt(l+ 1)} with {P tj (l+ 1), qt(l+
1), ut(l + 1)} fixed.
5: Update l = l + 1.
6: end for
It can be justified that problem (35) is convex in {P tj , qt, ut} for fixed {xt, yt, wt}, and it is convex
in {xt, yt, wt} for fixed {P tj , qt, ut}. Similarly, we can leverage the alternating optimization
method to acquire the optimal values of one block of variables with the other fixed iteratively.
The proposed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.
In the proposed algorithm, each subproblem is a convex program, which can be efficiently
tackled via classic convex optimization methodologies in polynomial time. It is worth noting that
because of the global lower bounds in (34), when the constraints of problem (35) are fulfilled,
those for the original problem (33) are also fulfilled; yet the reverse does not necessarily hold.
Thereby, the feasible region of (35) is a subset of that for (33), and the optimal value of (35) draws
an upper limitation to that of (33). By sequentially renewing the local point at each iteration
through solving (35), our proposed approach is established for the non-convex optimization
problem (33) or its original problem (29). Through the similar statements in [34] and [42], it
is demonstrated that the proposed approach is ensured to converge to at least a solution that
fulfills the KKT conditions of problem (33). A high-quality sub-optimal solution can therefore
be obtained by our proposed algorithm with a computational complexity of O(T 3.5w ) at a fast
convergence speed, as will be corroborated by simulation results provided in Section V.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results for the proposed approaches. The reference
channel power β0 is set as 10−12, the noise σ is set as −169 dBm/Hz, and the communication
bandwidth is 10 MHz. The distance between S and D is d = 200 m, and the UAV flies at an
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Fig. 4. UAV trajectory designs and jamming power allocations under NF scenario.
altitude of H = 100 m. The maximum horizontal speed of the UAV is set as V˜m = 40 m/s.
The slot length is δ = 0.1 s. The original capacity of the battery E0 is 7 × 103 J. Parameters
concerning the propulsion power and the harvested solar power are the same as in Tables I and
II. To evaluate the proposed optimal trajectory design and power allocation schemes, we test
three pairs of coordinates for the initial and final locations of the UAV. The three test cases are:
1) JF (Jamming Free) scenario: both the initial and final locations are inside the jamming-free
area of A, namely, (x0, y0) = (−50 m,−100 m), and (xT , yT ) = (100 m, 140 m); 2) IF (Initial
jamming Free) scenario: the initial location is inside A and the final location is outside A, namely,
(x0, y0) = (−50 m, 0), and (xT , yT ) = (100 m, 350 m); and 3) NF (No jamming Free) scenario:
both locations are outside A, namely, (x0, y0) = (300 m, 200 m), and (xT , yT ) = (200 m, 400 m).
To further observe the UAV’s behavior, we adopt three time horizons for each scenario, namely,
T = 10 s, 30 s and 60 s. Trajectory and power consumptions of the UAV are depicted every
second. Note that all pairs of coordinates are carefully selected such that at least one feasible
trajectory can be found for the UAV in the shortest time horizon.
Fig. 4 depicts the UAV’s trajectory designs (Fig. 4(a)) and jamming power allocations (Fig.
4(b)) for the simple system model in problem (7) under the NF scenario. The jamming-free area
of A for the LoS links is illustrated by an orange dash-dot line. It can be observed from Fig.
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Fig. 5. Total jamming energy consumptions of the UAV under NF scenario.
4 that when both the initial and final locations are outside A, the UAV intends to fly towards
A first, then travel to the final location. With sufficient traveling time (T = 30 s and 60 s), the
UAV first flies fast to A, then takes a detour at a very low speed inside A, and finally travels
quickly to its final location. During this process, the jamming power first decreases, then stays
at zero, and finally increases quickly in the last few time slots. This is consistent with the results
in Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. We also include the performance of the UAV with NLoS links
when T = 30 s in Fig. 4 (labeled as “NLoS”). It can be seen that the UAV’s trajectory does not
vary much under this scenario, and that its jamming power does not change smoothly with its
distance from the source due to the randomness invited by the S-D link. To further validate the
advantage of trajectory design on energy reduction, we examine three baseline schemes of the
UAV under the NF scenario when T = 30 s. The first scheme is labeled as “Low speed”, where
the UAV travels straightly from the initial location to the final location at a fixed speed (7.46
m/s). The second scheme is labeled as “Fly half”, where the UAV flies straightly to the final
location at a constant speed (14.91 m/s) during the first half of the period (15 s), and hovers
at the destination for the rest of the period. The third scheme is labeled as “Two lines”, where
the UAV first flies directly towards the point (200 m, 200 m), then flies to the final location,
following the trajectory of two line segments at a constant speed of 10 m/s.
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Fig. 7. UAV power allocations under JF scenario.
Fig. 5 shows the total energy consumptions of the UAV under the NF scenario. It is unveiled
by Figs. 4 and 5 that the UAV consumes significantly more jamming energy without careful
trajectory design. The overall energy consumption of the “Fly half” scheme is almost ninefold
of that of our proposed scheme, since the UAV flies quickly to the destination and hovers there
April 24, 2020 DRAFT
27
−100 −50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
−200
0
200
400
(a)      x (m)
y 
(m
)
 
 
Initial location
Final locationJamming−free area
T=10s
T=30s
T=60s
10 20 30 40 50 60
0
20
40
60
80
(b)      Time slot (s)
Po
w
er
 (W
)
 
 
Jamming power
Propulsion power
T=10s
T=30s
T=60s
Fig. 8. UAV trajectory designs and power allocations under IF scenario.
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
20
40
60
Time slot (s)
Ja
m
m
in
g 
po
we
r (
W
)
 
 
Fly first Hover first Round trip Low speed
 
 
Two lines
Proposed
5 10 15 20 25 30
20
40
60
80
100
120
Time slot (s)
Pr
op
ul
sio
n 
po
we
r (
W
)
 
 
Fly first Hover first Round trip Low speed
 
 
Two lines
Proposed
Fig. 9. UAV power allocations for baseline schemes under NF scenario.
for a relatively long period. As the destination is far from the source node, the longer the UAV
stays there, the more jamming energy it consumes. The “Two lines” scheme is the most energy-
efficient among the baseline schemes as it amounts to a simple optimization of the trajectory.
Under the same parameter setting, the UAV consumes more energy with NLoS links than with
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Fig. 10. Total energy consumptions of the UAV under NF scenario.
LoS links, since it experiences greater path loss with the former. Note that for the proposed
scheme, the total jamming energy does not increase with the length of the scheduling period,
since the UAV always spends the same duration outside A.
Figs. 6–10 depict the trajectory designs and energy management schemes of the UAV based
on the system model proposed for problem (29) in Section IV, where harvested solar energy,
propulsion power and other circuit consumptions are considered. Specifically, Figs. 6 and 7
demonstrate the convergence of the proposed approach for trajectory design and propulsion
power assignment of the UAV under the JF scenario. Since the lines for the 50-th and 60-th
iterations completely overlap, a fast convergence within 50 iterations can be readily observed
in both figures. The UAV travels either inside the jamming-free area of A or at the edge of A
and incurs no jamming power at any time, which corroborates Lemma 1. When T = 10 s, the
UAV can only choose to finish the journey at the speed incurring as little power consumption
as possible. When the time horizon is sufficiently long (T = 30 s and 60 s), the UAV carefully
designs its trajectory and takes a detour inside A so that it can travel at the best energy-efficient
speed Ve all the way.
Furthermore, it is shown in Fig. 8 that for the IF scenario when T = 10 s, the UAV has to
travel straightly from the initial location to the final location at a speed much faster than Ve, thus
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leading to a significant amount of propulsion power consumption at each slot. If there is surplus
time, the UAV first travels inside A at a constant speed of Ve, which minimizes the propulsion
power consumption. Then it flies to the final location, which is outside A, in the last few time
slots. This trajectory design enables the UAV to stay inside A for as long as possible, since the
shorter time it stays outside A, the less jamming energy it consumes.
To fully demonstrate the influence and merits of delicate trajectory design for the UAV, we
again compare with three baseline schemes where the UAV adopts different flying protocols for
the same trajectory as the “Low speed” scheme when T = 30 s. The first protocol is labelled
as “Fly first”, where the UAV flies to the final location at approximately Ve = 22.36 m/s in
the first 10 s, then hovers at the destination for the rest 20 s. The second protocol is labelled
as “Hover first”, where the UAV hovers above the initial location in the first 20 s, then flies to
the final location for the rest 10 s at speed Ve. The third protocol is labelled as “Round trip”,
where the UAV first takes a round trip between the initial and final locations, then flies again to
the destination, at speed Ve during the flight period. To facilitate comparison, we also include
the “Low speed”, “Two lines”, and our proposed schemes under the NF scenario. Figs. 9 and
10 depict the jamming and propulsion power allocations at each time slot, and the total energy
consumptions of the UAV, respectively. Table III lists the respective jamming and propulsion
energy consumptions for different schemes. It can be readily seen from Fig. 9 that the UAV
needs to send jamming signals at every time slot under the five baseline schemes, as it is always
traveling outside A. The propulsion power consumption for hovering triples that for traveling at
speed Ve. The “Fly first” scheme incurs the largest energy consumption for both jamming and
propulsion, due to its 20 s hovering at the farthest point from the suspicious source. It is further
revealed in Fig. 10 that the total energy consumption of the “Round trip” scheme is the lowest
among the baseline schemes, since it adopts a simple trajectory design with the energy-efficient
speed. It is observed from Table III that the jamming energy consumption is the highest for the
“Fly first” and “Round trip” schemes, while the propulsion energy consumption is the highest
for the “Fly first” and “Hover first” schemes. Our proposed scheme consumes the least jamming
energy and propulsion energy. Clearly, all of the baseline schemes consume more energy than
our proposed scheme. In a nutshell, the UAV suffers significant waste of energy without careful
trajectory optimization.
Remark 5. (Mitigating the interference on other links): When the suspicious link intentionally
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TABLE III
RESPECTIVE JAMMING AND PROPULSION ENERGY CONSUMPTIONS FOR DIFFERENT SCHEMES UNDER NF SCENARIO.
Optimization schemes Jamming energy (J) Propulsion energy (J)
Fly first 1042.9 2850.0
Hover first 396.3 2850.0
Round trip 1042.9 1255.2
Low speed 623.7 2427.5
Two lines 412.8 1968.6
Proposed 165.2 1255.2
chooses to be located in a wild rural area to avoid surveillance by existing monitoring infras-
tructures, there would be few communication links in the vicinity, and the interference caused by
jamming could thereby be reduced to the minimum level, which is negligible. In fact, it typically
depends on the access scheme whether jamming suppresses communications of other links. For
instance, if the suspicious link occupies a certain frequency band all to itself, the UAV is able
to send exclusive jamming signals to it, which will not affect other links. On the other hand, if
serious communication degradation is reported by legitimate users within the neighborhood, the
UAV can release the specific transmitted (and encrypted) information to these users so that they
can decode the jamming signals and will not be interfered. Note that the maximum jamming
power of 40 W in Figs. 4 and 9 is the worst-case value tested in the simulation. Yet in practice,
the UAV is not usually that far away from the suspicious source and does not incur such a high
jamming power consumption.
VI. CONCLUSION
We addressed joint energy management and trajectory optimization for a rotary-wing UAV
enabled legitimate monitoring system. Building on a judicious (re-)formulation, we leveraged
the alternating optimization and successive convex approximation methodologies to minimize
the overall energy consumption of the UAV. Efficient algorithms were developed to compute
the locally optimal solution or at least a feasible solution fulfilling the KKT conditions. We
provided extensive numerical test results to justify the effectiveness of the proposed schemes.
The proposed framework also inspires new directions for future researches on security issues
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in UAV-aided wireless networks such as wireless power transfer and/or mobile edge computing
based ones, especially with non-LoS channels and 3D trajectory planning.
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